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Abstract
This paper investigates the reasons why African farmers who face similar ﬁ-
nancial constraints and agro-ecological conditions diﬀer in fertilizer use behavior.
We conducted a survey on 1300 maize producers in the Mouhoun and Tuy regions
of Burkina Faso in order to collect data on fertilizer use. In addition, we asked
hypothetical risk aversion and time discounting questions. Taking into account in-
dividual ﬁnancial constraints and access to fertilizer for maize production, we show
that experimental choices about time preferences correlate with observed fertilizer
use behavior. This paper presents one of the the ﬁrst ﬁeld evidence that links hy-
pothetical time discount questions to observed agricultural decisions.
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1 Introduction
In the last forty years, cereals yields rose signiﬁcantly in most of developing countries, but
Sub-Saharan Africa has not participated to such an agricultural success (World Bank,
2008). Yields have reached an average of ﬁve tons per hectare in Eastern Asia while
they maintain themselves around one ton per hectare in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is com-
monly admitted that rising yields have been driven by the widespread use of irrigation,
improved varieties and fertilizer use and that the low use of fertilizers is responsible for
the observed stagnation of yields in Africa (Morris, Kelly, Kopicki, and Byerlee, 2007).
There is an extensive literature on agricultural technology adoption in developing coun-
tries that seeks to understand why farmers in some countries are reluctant to adopt
innovations while farmers in other countries are not. Regarding the low adoption of
chemical fertilizers in Africa, the most commonly advanced reasons are related to both
demand-side and supply-side factors. Demand for fertilizer can be hindered either be-
cause of high fertilizer prices, or low ability of farmers to raise the resources needed to
purchase fertilizer (Binswanger and Sillers, 1983; Ramaswani, 1992; Duﬂo et al., 2011).
On the supply side, fertilizer distribution may be discouraged by an unfavorable business
climate characterized by a small market size, high transportation costs and high cost of
ﬁnancing (Morris, Kelly, Kopicki, and Byerlee, 2007). Moreover, the fact that farmers
facing similar ﬁnancial constraints and agro-ecological conditions diﬀer in fertilizer pur-
chasing behavior suggests that diﬀerences in agricultural decisions may also be explained
by individual preferences. This paper investigates the importance of risk and time pref-
erences in agricultural behavior focusing on fertilizer use.
Standard practice in inter-temporal welfare analyses is to assume that risk and time
preferences are the same across farmers when one would expect a priori that subjective
time preferences diﬀer across diﬀerent individuals (Harrison, Humphrey, and Verschoor,
2010). For that reason, very recent papers from the ﬁeld experiment literature aim at
eliciting risk aversion coeﬃcients and discount rates for individuals. Harrison, Lau, and
Williams (2002) elicit individual discount rates from a nationally representative sample
of 268 Danish people. Using a sample of 253 Danish people as well, Andersen, Harrison,
Lau, and Rutstrom (2008) make a joint elicitation of both discount rates and risk aver-
sion coeﬃcients, such approach providing lower estimates of discount rates compared to
previous studies. Focusing on developing countries, Harrison, Humphrey, and Verschoor
(2010) use data collected from risky choice experiments in Ethiopia, India and Uganda.
Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010) collect data from sample of 160 Vietnamese vil-
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lagers and show that people living in wealthy villages are not only less risk averse but
also more patient.
There is a long tradition in development economics of collecting original data on agri-
cultural behavior in order to test a speciﬁc economic hypothesis (Duﬂo, 2006). Recently,
a literature has merged with an expertise in setting up ﬁeld experiments in order to
elicit farmers' individual preferences in developing countries. To date however, very few
papers were able to show that experimental choices correlate with observed agricultural
behavior. Yet, understanding such relationship - if there is any - is of importance for
development because it would help designing relevant development policies. Typically,
very impatient people may be reluctant to use development tools like saving products or
microcredit innovations.
The small number of studies that aim to determine to what extent individual prefer-
ences drive agricultural decisions have in common to show that present-biased preferences
determine to the adoption of saving or credit innovations provided through randomized
control trials. Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) asked hypothetical time discounting ques-
tions to 1777 clients of a Philippine bank and show that women who exhibited present-
biased preferences were indeed signiﬁcantly more likely to open a savings account with
restrict access. On the same line, Bauer, Chytilova, and Morduch (2012) show from
a random sample of 573 Indian villagers that, among women who borrow, those with
present-biased preferences are particularly likely to be microcredit borrowers. Recently,
Dupas and Robinson (2013) use data from a ﬁeld experiment in Kenya in order to show
that providing individuals with simple informal savings technologies can substantially
increase investment in preventative health. Their results moreover indicate that women
who exhibit present-biased preferences do not beneﬁt from saving product with easily
access to the money while they do beneﬁt from the combination of the stronger commit-
ment to make regular contributions and credit provided by a group setting (in this case,
a Rotating Savings and Credit Association). All of these studies conjecture from their
results that time-inconsistency might be an important constraint for saving, whether at
home or in a self-help group with microcredit purpose. In particular, they suggest that
if the present-biased individuals are sophisticated enough, they will opt for commitment-
saving mechanisms that allow them to save according to their future plans and keep them
from giving in to their immediate temptations.
3
This paper contributes to the literature that aims to highlight a link between elicited
individual preferences and observed agricultural decisions in several ways. First, we focus
on fertilizer use for crop production, while previous studies have focused on credit and
saving products. Second, contrary to Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) and Dupas and
Robinson (2013) who study the impact of individual preferences on the participation to
a development program, we rather study current agricultural behavior of farmers. Third,
we provide evidence that a time-consistent model of discounting can explain variability
in fertilizer use. Duﬂo, Kremer, and Robinson (2011) argue that even when facing small
ﬁxed costs of purchasing fertilizer, farmers may postpone fertilizer purchases until later
periods. When they have inconsistent time preferences, those farmers end up being im-
patient in the last period in which buying is possible and ﬁnally fail to invest in fertilizer.
We argue that even in cases when farmers are not ﬁnancially constrained and beneﬁt
from facilitated access to fertilizer, we can establish a causal link between the discount
rate and fertilizer use in a framework where farmers are time-consistent.
In the next section we model fertilizer investment decisions of a farmer who displays
time consistent preferences. The model predicts that the quantity of fertilizer used is
an increasing function of the discount rate and independent of risk aversion. Section 3
describes the sample, experimental design for eliciting discount rates, risk aversion co-
eﬃcients and the survey data. Section 4 shows how the experimental choices correlate
with observed fertilizer use behavior and Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Fertilizer Use
2.1 No uncertainty
We consider the inter-temporal decision of a farmer who produces maize. A typical year
is divided into two periods: the harvest season and the lean season. At the harvest sea-
son, the farmer gets its production ft, consumes ft − st ≥ 0 and keeps st up to the lean
season. At the harvest season, the price of cereals is p. There is thus no uncertainty on
crop prices nor on harvest levels. This assumption is left aside later.
At the lean season, the farmer buys (and uses) a quantity xt of fertilizers at unit
price b. He consumes the remaining value of his harvest, pst − wxt ≥ 0, where p is the
price of cereals at the lean season. The production ft increases with the quantity of
fertilizers used, xt−1. Formally, ft ≡ f (xt−1) and f ′ > 0 (we also assume f ′′ ≤ 0). In
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our framework, fhe farmer has no access to credit and cannot store any valuable goods
between the lean season and the next harvest season, meaning that the whole harvested
quantity is supposed to be self-consumed or sold before the next harvest season.
The price of cereals usually increase from the harvest season to the lean season, and
then we assume that p > p. Let u denotes the utility function of the farmer (with u′ > 0
and u′′ ≤ 0) and √ρ denotes the discount factor between two seasons (from harvest to
lean or from lean to harvest). Starting from the harvest season of year t, the discounted
sum of utility of the farmer is given by
Ut =
+∞∑
d=t
ρ
d−t
2 u
(
p (f (xd−1)− sd)
)
+ ρ
d−t+1
2 u (psd − bxd)
The farmer chooses the quantities of fertilizer, xt, and the stocks, st, for all t, that max-
imizes his discounted sum of utility.
The necessary conditions for an interior solution (xt > 0, st > 0, ft − st > 0,
pst − wxt > 0) are:
−pu′ (p (f (xt−1)− st))+ p√ρu′ (pst − bxt) = 0,
and,
−bu′ (pst − bxt) + pf ′ (xt)√ρu′
(
p (f (xt)− st+1)
)
= 0.
Let us focus on the stationary solution, i.e. xt = x and st = s. The necessary conditions
become:
u′ (ps− bx)
pu′
(
p (f (x)− s)) = 1√ρp,
and, √
ρf ′ (x)
b
=
u′ (ps− bx)
pu′
(
p (f (x)− s))
Hence, we must have
f ′ (x) =
b
ρp
or,
x = f ′−1
(
b
ρp
)
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The model thus shows that the quantity of fertilizers:
• is a decreasing function of the price of fertilizers, b.
• is an increasing function of the (annual) discount rate (patience), ρ.
• is an increasing function of the price of cereals at the lean season, p.
• does not depend on the utility function, u. Hence, it does not depend on risk
aversion.
• does not depend on the price of cereals at the harvest season, p.
2.2 Price and harvest uncertainty
Assume that, at the time of the harvest season, the price of cereals in the lean season is
unknown. It is distributed according to cumulative distribution H. At the time of the
lean season, future harvest is also not perfectly known. We assume that the harvest is
γf , where γ is distributed according to cumulative distribution G.
At the harvest season of year t, the harvest γf (xt−1) is known. The farmer chooses
st that maximizes:
Ut =
+∞∑
d=t
ρ
d−t
2 u
(
p (γf (xd−1)− sd)
)
+ ρ
d−t+1
2
∫
u (psd − bxd) dH (p)
The ﬁrst order condition is given by:
pu′
(
p (γf (xd−1)− sd)
)
=
√
ρ
∫
pu′ (psd − bxd) dH (p)
At the lean season of year t, the price is known, it is p. The farmer chooses xt that
maximizes:
Ut =
+∞∑
d=t
ρ
d−t
2 u (psd − bxd) + ρ
d−t+1
2
∫
u
(
p (γf (xd)− sd+1)
)
dG (γ)
The ﬁrst order condition is given by:
bu′ (pst − bxt) = √ρpf ′ (xt)
∫
γu′
(
p (γf (xt)− st+1)
)
dG (γ)
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The two ﬁrst order conditions can be rewritten as follows:
p
∫
γu′
(
p (γf (xt−1)− st)
)
dG (γ) = E (γ)
√
ρ
∫
pu′ (pst − bxt) dH (p) ,
and,
b
∫
pu′ (pst − bxt) dH (p) = E (p)√ρpf ′ (xt)
∫
γu′
(
p (γf (xt)− st+1)
)
dG (γ)
or,
p
E (γ)
√
ρ
=
∫
pu′ (pst − bxt) dH (p)∫
γu′
(
p (γf (xt−1)− st)
)
dG (γ)
,
and,
f ′ (xt−1) =
b
E (p)
√
ρp
∫
pu′ (pst − bxt) dH (p)∫
γu′
(
p (γf (xt)− st+1)
)
dG (γ)
Let us focus on the stationary solution. The stationary quantity of fertilizer is given
x = f ′−1
(
b
E (γ)E (p) ρ
)
,
for all t.
The quantity of fertilizers:
• is a decreasing function of the price of fertilizers, b.
• is an increasing function of the (annual) discount rate (patience), ρ.
• is an increasing function of the expected price of cereals at the lean season, E (p).
• is an increasing function of the expected "yield", E (γ).
• does not depend on the utility function, u. Hence, it does not depend on risk
aversion.
• does not depend on the price of cereals at the harvest season, p.
3 Experimental and Survey Design
The survey design generated a representative sample of farmers in two administrative
districts of Burkina Faso, Tuy and Mouhoun provinces. Those provinces are located in
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the west region of the country, which is the main maize production area. Data were col-
lected in January 2013 in cooperation with the Confédération Paysanne du Faso (CPF), a
nation-wide producer organization. A total number of 77 villages were randomly selected
from the CPF list. In those villages, an average number of 20 households were randomly
selected as well. With the help of the Burkinabe Agriculture Ministry, twenty investiga-
tors and two supervisors were recruited. A total number of 1549 farmers were surveyed
between January 21, 2013 and February 7, 2013. Surveys were conducted in Dioula
language. The survey included an experimental section aimed at eliciting risk and time
preferences and a household survey part aimed at characterizing households and farm-
ing decisions. We interviewed the household head, deﬁned as the person responsible for
farming decisions.
3.1 Household survey
The household survey was made of nine distinct sections: (i) socio-economic characteris-
tics of the household and of the household's head; (ii) household's economic assets; (iii)
crop production; (iv) crop sales; (v) fertilizer expenses: (vi) non agricultural activities un-
dertaken by the household members; (vii) household's social expenses; (viii) household's
loans and (ix) household's food expenses. The summary statistics at the household level
are presented in Table 1. On average, surveyed households have 13 members, 7 being
working with farming activities. In our sample, 30% of households are equipped with
latrines and with sheet metal roof in 70% of cases. Households hold an average of 5 bikes,
1 motorbike and 2 heads of draft cattle. In the majority of the cases, the household is
headed by a man, who is 43 years old on average, has received a written education in 40%
of cases and is very often member of a farmer organization (85% of cases), whatsoever
CPF or another organization.
In the regions were surveys were conducted, main crops are cotton, maize, sorghum,
millet and sesame. Millet and sorghum are traditionally consumed, while maize and
sesame are sold as well. This is reﬂected in the average sown areas and in the produc-
tion levels in the sample (Table 1). Average yields are of 1.1 ton per ha for cotton, 1.5
ton per ha for maize and respectively 0.8 and 0.7 per ha for sorghum and millet. The
diﬀerence in cereal yields is likely to result from diﬀerent fertilizer uses. Many farmers
indeed use fertilizer for maize production, which is not the case for other cereals. The
average quantity of fertilizer used for maize production - 238 kg per ha - hides a quite
high heterogeneity among sampled farmers, as quarter of the sample does not use any
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Table 1: Sample characteristics
Household's characteristics unit Obs. mean std. dev.
family size number 1549 12.7 8.8
labor force number 1549 7.1 5.4
latrine yes=1, no=0 1549 0.32 0.46
roof quality yes=1, no=0 1549 0.69 0.46
bike number 1549 4.9 4.2
motorbike number 1549 0.95 1.13
draft cattle number 1549 2.4 2.54
sex yes=male 1549 0.98 0.13
age years 1549 42.9 12.7
education yes=1, no=0 1549 0.39 0.49
producer organization yes=1, no=0 1549 0.85 0.35
Cultivated areas
cotton ha 1549 3.95 4.61
maize ha 1549 2.06 3.28
sorghum ha 1549 1.84 2.2
millet ha 1549 0.89 1.55
sesame ha 1549 0.5 1.07
Production levels
cotton kg 1543 4454 10867
maize kg 1545 3624 7100
sorghum kg 1546 1340 1953
millet kg 1547 544 1002
sesame kg 1540 105 262
Yield levels
cotton kg per ha 1218 1145 2145
maize kg per ha 1273 1543 1269
sorghum kg per ha 1212 819 1529
millet kg per ha 796 700 1077
sesame kg per ha 600 239 323
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fertilizer for maize production.
The fertilizers used by the sampled farmers come from various sources, most farmers
using fertilizers they receive from the ﬁrm that buys their cotton production, the cotton
marketing board. In Burkina Faso, cotton is indeed a vertically integrated sector, where
producers are ensured to sell their production at the end of the season and to receive
fertilizers at the beginning of the season. The amount of fertilizers they receive is linked
to the cotton surface they declare to cultivate. Fertilizer costs are deducted from the
price they receive at the end of the season. The maize sector is much less integrated
and maize producers do not have a speciﬁc mechanism to facilitate them fertilizer access,
although there are stores in the area. In the absence of such a fertilizer delivery scheme,
farmers strategy tend to be the diversion of part of the cotton fertilizer package that they
receive from the marketing board, in order to apply fertilizer in their maize ﬁelds. This
is a risky strategy, as cotton yields are likely to be lower and this may in turn arouse
suspicion from the marketing board. Thus we expect that more risk adverse farmers will
not fully follow this strategy. We take this into account in our empirical estimations.
3.2 Eliciting Risk and Time Preferences
In order to elicit farmers' risk and time preferences, we use an artefactual ﬁeld experiment
in the terminology of Harrison and List (2004). We asked hypothetical risk aversion and
time discounting questions.
3.2.1 Risk aversion
Our experiments were built on the risk aversion experiments of Holt and Laury (2002).
We used a multiple price list design to measure individual risk preferences. We ran two
experiments oﬀering successively low and high payoﬀs. In each experiment, each partic-
ipant was presented a choice between two lotteries of risky and safe options, and this
choice was repeated nine times with diﬀerent pairs of lotteries, as illustrated in Table 2
in the case of low pay-oﬀs. Farmers were asked to choose either lottery A or lottery B
at each game (a game is a row in the table). The ﬁrst row of Table 2 indicates that
lottery A oﬀers a 10% probability of receiving 1000 FCFA and a 90% probability of re-
ceiving 800 FCFA, while lottery B oﬀers a 10% probability of a 1925 FCFA payoﬀ and a
90% probability of 50 FCFA payoﬀ.
Low payoﬀs were chosen because they ﬁtted previous experiments of Holt and Laury
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Table 2: The paired lottery-choice decisions with low payoﬀs
lottery A lottery B
prob 1 gain 1 prob 2 gain 2 | prob 3 gain 3 prob 4 gain 4 range of r
1 0.1 1000 0.9 800 | 0.1 1925 0.9 50 −∞ -1.71
2 0.2 1000 0.8 800 | 0.2 1925 0.8 50 -1.71 -0.95
3 0.3 1000 0.7 800 | 0.3 1925 0.7 50 -0.95 -0.49
4 0.4 1000 0.6 800 | 0.4 1925 0.6 50 -0.49 -0.14
5 0.5 1000 0.5 800 | 0.5 1925 0.5 50 -0.14 0.15
6 0.6 1000 0.4 800 | 0.6 1925 0.4 50 0.15 0.41
7 0.7 1000 0.3 800 | 0.7 1925 0.3 50 0.41 0.68
8 0.8 1000 0.2 800 | 0.8 1925 0.2 50 0.68 0.97
9 0.9 1000 0.1 800 | 0.9 1925 0.1 50 0.97 1.37
10 1 1000 0 800 | 1 1925 0 50 1.37 +∞
Note: Last column was not shown to respondents.
(2002) and Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstrom (2008) and because they amount
to approximately one day income for a non skilled worker in Burkina Faso (around
1000 FCFA a day, ie 2 USD a day). In the second experiment, farmers were asked to
choose between lotteries with 10 times higher payoﬀs. The oﬀered payoﬀs were corre-
sponding to an important amount of money, 10000 FCFA (around 20 USD) corresponding
to the average price of one bag of 100 kg cereal after harvest or to 10 days income for a
non skilled worker.
In practice, lotteries A and B were materialized by two bags containing 10 balls of
diﬀerent colors (green for 1000 FCFA, blue for 800 FCFA, black for 1920 FCFA and
transparent for 50 FCFA). The composition of the bags was revealed to the farmers but
they had to choose between picking a ball in bag A or bag B without seeing the balls
(blind draw). As indicated in last column of Table 2, neutral risk adverse individuals
(r around zero) are expected to switch from lottery A to lottery B at row 5, while risk
loving individuals (r < 0) are expected to switch to lottery B before row 5 and risk
adverse individuals (r > 0) are expected to switch to lottery B after row 5.
Since all lottery choices are in the gain domain, we assume a utility function of the
following form:
U(x) = x1−r/(1− r)
where x is the lottery prize and r is the parameter to be estimated and denotes risk
aversion. Expected utility is the probability weighted utility of each outcome in each
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row. A farmer is indiﬀerent between lottery A (probability pA to earn a ; probability
1− pA to earn b) and lottery B (probability pB to earn c and probability 1− pB to earn
d), if and only if his expected utility is the same in both lotteries:
pA.U(a) + (1− pA).U(b) = pB.U(c) + (1− pB).U(d)
Assuming a CRRA (Constant relative Risk Aversion) utility function,
pA.
a1−r
1− r + (1− pA)
b1−r
1− r = pB.
c1−r
1− r + (1− pB)
d1−r
1− r
which can be solved numerically in term of r.
Just as in Holt and Laury (2002) and Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstrom (2008),
we allow risk aversion to be a linear function of the observed households' characteristics.
We consider six characteristics that we assumed unambiguously exogenous in driving risk
preferences: gender, age, family size, education, village, province. Estimated individual
r coeﬃcients are predicted values of the model, which we estimate using an interval re-
gression (tobit model). Figure1 displays the distribution of the risk coeﬃcients predicted
from the low-payoﬀ experiment. Results show that a minority of farmers exhibit a risk
loving or risk neutrality behavior. Most of the farmers are risk adverse, with an average
of r = 0.69 in the low-payoﬀ experiment and r = 0.63 in the high-payoﬀ experiment.
This is in line with previous ﬁndings suggesting that farmers' preference for risk is quite
low (Binswanger and Sillers, 1983). Those average values are comparable to the ones
obtained by Harrison, Humphrey, and Verschoor (2010) for India, Ethiopia and Uganda
using similar experiments.
3.2.2 Discount Rate
To our knowledge, there is no study that aim to elicit discount rates in developing coun-
tries. We thus built our time preference experiment on works of Harrison, Lau, and
Williams (2002) and of Coller and Williams (1999). However we had to adapt the con-
tent in order to present pay-oﬀs that make sense to the respondents. To do so, we ran
pre-tests of the experiment from a subset of farmers before the survey. We used two
experiments to elicit farmers' time preferences, those experiments diﬀering in the time
delays oﬀered to the farmers. In the ﬁrst experiment, farmers were invited to choose be-
tween receiving a given amount in one day time (option A) or receiving a bigger amount
in ﬁve-days time (option B), and this choice had been repeated nine times, with diﬀerent
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Figure 1: Estimated risk aversion coeﬃcients (low payoﬀs)
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payoﬀs. The amount of payment A corresponds to the average price of one bag of 100 kg
of cereals after harvest. Table 3 displays the experiment aiming to elicit this discount
rate that we call current discount rate hereafter. The ﬁrst row of Table 3 indicates that
farmer had to choose between receiving 10,000 FCFA tomorrow or 10,400 FCFA in ﬁve
days.
In a second experiment, farmers were invited to choose between receiving a given
amount in one month-time (option A) or receiving a bigger amount in two-months time
(option B), and this choice being repeated eight times, with diﬀerent payoﬀs. Table 4
Table 3: Would you prefer to get A in one day or B in ﬁve days?
A B
1 10000 10400
2 10000 10700
3 10000 11000
4 10000 11500
5 10000 12000
6 10000 13000
7 10000 14000
8 10000 17000
9 10000 20000
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Table 4: Would you prefer to get A in one month or B in two months?
A B range of δ
1 10000 12000 0 0.06
2 10000 15000 0.06 0.13
3 10000 18000 0.13 0.19
4 10000 20000 0.19 0.23
5 10000 23000 0.23 0.28
6 10000 29000 0.28 0.38
7 10000 48000 0.38 0.60
8 10000 75000 0.60 0.83
displays the experiment aiming to elicit this discount rate δ (such that ρ = 1/(1 + δ))
that we call future discount rate hereafter.
An agent is indiﬀerent between receiving payment Mt at time t or payment Mt+1 at
time t+ 1 if and only if:
U(w +Mt) +
1
1 + δ
U(w) = U(w) +
1
1 + δ
U(w +Mt+1)
where w is his background consumption and δ accounts for the discount rate which is
the parameter to be estimated. Assuming again a CRRA utility function and assuming
no background consumption, this writes:
M1−rt
1− r =
1
1 + δ
M1−rt+1
1− r ,
from which we get δ as a function of risk aversion r:
δ =
[
Mt+1
Mt
]1−r
− 1
Here again we allow δ to be a linear function of exogenous covariates. Estimated indi-
vidual δ coeﬃcients are predicted values of the model that we also use in order to elicit
individual r, which we estimate again using an interval regression. Figure2 displays the
estimated current discount rates.
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Figure 2: Estimated current discount rates
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4 Elicited Impatience and Observed Fertilizer Use
We now aim to estimate the fertilizer demand in accordance with the theoretical model
presented in Section 2. In the empirical model, the quantity of fertilizer used is a vari-
able which measures the total quantity of plant nutrients used per unit of maize land.
Fertilizer products includes nitrogenous, potash, and phosphate fertilizers. The farmer's
impatience is measured by δ and risk aversion is measured by r. We moreover control
for prices by adding dummies for municipalities.1 We proxy household capital through
the number of bovines and chariots, and labor force is measured through the number
of people in the family who work in farm activities. Finally, we control for the total
area cultivated by the household and the cotton cultivated area in order to take into ac-
count that some farmers have facilitated access to fertilizer through the cotton marketing
board:
yi = β0 + β1δi + β1ri + β3Xi + i
where i ∼ N(0, σ) and X includes control variables.
We argue that no selection bias problem can arise in this framework because farmers
who use fertilizer for maize production diﬀer from farmers who do not in characteristics
1Municipalities are administrative areas that are larger than villages and smaller than provinces, and
that we believe relevant to catch spatial price variability in the studied area.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for sample used in the regression
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Unit
Qty of fertilizer 286.1 463.1 0 5800 kg per ha
bovine 8.4 18.8 0 443 nb
chariot 0.86 0.64 0 4 nb
labor force 7.6 5.5 1 45 nb
total area 10.9 9.2 .12 88.5 ha
cotton area 4.4 4.8 0 45 ha
r (low) 0.72 0.64 -3.2 3.25 none
r (high) 0.6552 0.73 -3.06 4.14 none
δ (current) 1.11 1.21 -0.99 9.44 none
δ (future) 0.21 0.25 -0.59 1.03 none
that are observable to us. Applying OLS to the empirical model thus yields unbiased
estimates of βs. Results are presented in Table 6. Overall, results show that risk aversion
does not aﬀect fertilizer use, which is in line with the theoretical model. Time preference
appears to decrease signiﬁcantly fertilizer quantity, especially when measured through
the current discount rate. Focusing on a farmer exhibiting a current discount rate of
1.11, which is the mean value of the sample (see Table 5), a a one standard deviation
increase in impatience would decrease fertilizer use by 9%. The fact that future discount
rate does not drive signiﬁcantly fertilizer use in our data deserves further investigation.
5 Conclusion
The textbook model of optimal fertilizer consumption choice tells that impatience de-
creases fertilizer use. Standard practice in inter-temporal welfare analyses is to assume
that time preferences are the same across farmers when one would expect a priori that
subjective time preferences diﬀer across diﬀerent individuals. In this paper we elicit
discount rates for individuals. Taking into account individual ﬁnancial constraints and
access to fertilizer for maize production, we moreover show that experimental choices
correlate with observed fertilizer use behavior. This result is in line with prediction of
the textbook model of optimal fertilizer consumption choice made by time-consistent
farmers.
This paper presents one of the the ﬁrst ﬁeld evidence that links hypothetical time
discount questions to observed agricultural decisions. it contributes to the literature in
several ways. First, we focus on fertilizer use for crop production, while previous studies
have focused on saving products. Second, contrary to Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006)
16
Table 6: Time discounting and fertilizer use - OLS estimates
[1] [2] [3] [4]
bovine 3.02 3.0432 3.0026 3.0220
(2.3695) (2.3741) (2.3597) (2.3633)
chariot 14.058 15.9929 14.1996 16.0306
(25.5736) (25.4825) (25.8008) (25.7534)
labour -2.4771 -2.1903 -2.4200 -2.1340
(3.9693) (3.9952) (4.0356) (4.0751)
area_tot 33.3531 *** 33.5525 *** 33.2906 *** 33.4725 ***
(4.8345) (4.7949) (4.8441) (4.8059)
area_cot -6.4741 -7.0388 -6.1038 -6.6287
(7.8848) (7.8283) (7.8688) (7.8084)
r 30.3094 33.7650 15.8044 18.7589
(21.6272) (22.7009) (19.4475) (19.8810)
δ -90.5015 ◦ -22.6518 ** -80.5195 -20.5616 **
(56.3661) (9.5535) (59.4541) (9.9852)
constant -84.81981 -71.6518 -69.7181 -57.7115
(77.2607) (84.0397) (77.1185) (82.3210)
Village dum. yes yes yes yes
Payoﬀs low low high high
Time frame future current future current
Obs. 1271 1271 1271 1271
Eﬀect of
rho (+1sd) -22.2453 27.4992 -19.7917 -24.9618
/mean value -7.8% -9.6% -6.9% -8.7%
r (+1sd) 19.3586 21.5657 11.5546 13.7146
/mean value +6.8% +7.5% +4% +4.8%
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and Dupas and Robinson (2013) who study the impact of individual preferences on the
participation to a development program, we rather study current agricultural behavior
of farmers. Third, contrary to studies that focus on self-discipline problems that farmers
may face when they make farming decisions, we provide evidence that a time-consistent
model of discounting can explain variability in fertilizer use. We argue that even in
cases when farmers are not ﬁnancially constrained and beneﬁt from facilitated access to
fertilizer, we can establish a causal link between the discount rate and fertilizer use in a
framework where farmers are time-consistent.
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